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Abstract
This paper deals with the cost of treatment of the ultimate waste, that is waste which cannot,
in the absence of recycling opportunities, be reduced by a suitable taxation scheme. We propose
a new way to handle this waste based on a Waste Management Contracts (WMC) which largely
implicates the households in the cost reduction process. Within a set of feasible, i.e. budget
balancing, incentive compatible and acceptable, contracts we characterize the optimal WMC
and compare this system to a more standard one based on an Advanced and a Disposal Fee
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1 Introduction
For the last few years, environmentalists and policy makers have focused on increasing attention
to the question of waste management (see for instance Jenkins [11], Dinan [5] or Fullerton
and Kinnanan [7]) and it is now largely recognized that consumption generates an increasing
amount of garbage, the handling of which induces a growing social cost. From that point of
view, it becomes obvious that the households, acting as Citizens, should participate in the waste
management programs or at least have enough incentives to do so. Their contributions can be
twice : they can try to reduce the amount of waste induced by her consumption and, perhaps
more generally, furnish a targeted e¤ort which reduces the waste treatment cost.
Most of the literature, in the best of our knowledge, essentially focus on the reduction of
the amount of waste. These policies for green design often combine upstream and downstream
taxation schemes in order to modify the design of the product or to encourage recycling (see
for instance Fullerton and Wu [9], Walls and Palmer [17], Calcott and Walls [1], [2]). Even if
these policies are more or less e¢ cient according to the commodity under consideration (see
Palmer and al [14] or Jenkins and al [12]), it is however widely acknowledged that a two-part
taxation mechanism based on a generalized deposit-refund system (see Palmer and Walls [13] or
Fullerton and Wolverton [10]) is able to implement a social optimal waste reduction policy. But
the transmission of these incentives rely on the existence of markets for recyclable, and on the
ability to use theses goods in a reversed production system. So, even these potentials exist, it is
quite di¢ cult to assume that no residual waste remains or that its collection and destruction is
free of cost.
Our paper essentially deals with this ultimate waste and our object is to design a contract
which largely implicates the households in the reduction of its treatment cost. One well-known
option consists in implementing a per bag pricing policy. This pecular contract provides some
incentives to reduce the amount of waste, hence it global treatement cost. In fact, the agency
in charge of the waste destruction decentralizes a part of the its activity at the consumer level
because their e¤ort reduces the amount of waste and, in compensation, implictely transfert to
these agents a amount of money measured by the reduction in their global waste treatment
charge.
It is nevertheless largely acknowledged that this e¤ort is not directly observable and that the
proxy which consists in measuring the amount of waste induces illegal dumping (see Fullerton
and Kinnanan [7], [8]). This drawback gives rise to ine¢ ciency and leads to second best policies
since the implementation of a Disposal Fee (DF for short) policy requires a costly incentive
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scheme in order to prevent midnight dumping (see Choe and Fraser[3])1. This is why par bag
pricing policy are often based on a monitoring technology associated to a two-part tari¤ , that
is a DF which prevents illegal dumping and an Advanced DF (ADF for short) which is directly
includes (by a tax) in the price of the goods such that both the monitoring and the waste
treatment costs are covered2.
Shinkuma[15] even argues that in the presence of both illegal dumping and a transaction
cost associated to a recycling subsidy, this two-part tari¤ can challenge a deposit-refund system,
i.e. a two-part taxation, especially if the marginal transaction cost is high enough. To be more
precise, if the waste reduction e¤ort conduct to recycling, it may happen that a recycling subsidy
net of the transaction cost induces a lower level of e¤ort than an incentive compatible two-part
tari¤ .
But our objectif is not to introduce a new mechanism which challenges a two-part taxation
system. We favour complementarity since the rst attempt to reduce the amount of waste by
encouraging reprocessing while the second should motivate the households to provide a specic
e¤ort in order to reduce the cost of treatment of the ultimate waste. This is typically not
the case with a two-part tari¤ policy since the DF induces some incentives to reduce the total
amount of waste including the recyclable. One instrument, the per bag pricing policy, targets
therfore two objectives : recycling and ultimate waste treatment cost. But this also imply that
the households e¤ort should be more targeted. He should at least provide two kinds of e¤orts
: one motivated by standard market mechanisms which induces recycling and the second being
rewarded by the social gains obtained by the reduction of the ultimate waste treatment cost.
Our propostion consist in adding targeted contract. This gives the opportunity to the house-
holds to freely act for the presevation of environment by participating to the waste treatment
reduction cost and to obtain, if they accept the contract, a nancial compensation. This seems,
a priori, rather abstract. But a policy maker can easily identify some specic activities be-
longing to the waste pretreatment operation before destruction and centralize these processes at
the households level. It includes, for instance, sorting by using di¤erent bins, the destruction
of a certain kind of material, composting and so on. The idea is simply to give to the waste
producers, the opportunity to realize some pretreatment activities or, if not, to pay for it. This
is, for instance, the motivation of the new regulation which came into force in the UK in October
1 It is even argued by Choe and Fraser [4] that the introduction of a specic household e¤ort reduces the
exibility of a deposit and refund policy and leads to a second best.
2For the more general class of durable goods, Shinkuma [16] even argues that an ADF policy is less e¢ cient
than a DF one. In this case, an ADF policy reduces the incentives to repair the commodity and depresses the
second hand market. This induces an excessive consumption and a larger disposal cost in respect to the social
optimum.
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2007 (for more detail the reader is referred to Treatment of non-hazardous waste for landll :
your waste-your responsibility Environment Agency UK [6]).
The mechanism beyond this contract is quite simple. The households pre-pay the waste
treatment cost as in a standard full ADF system and are not charged for their waste disposal.
But they have the opportunity to sign a contract which species an activity reducing the waste
treatment cost, for instance the reception of several bins associated to a commitment to sort,
and which stipulates a monetary compensation for this job. Households may however cheat by
taking the money and by making no e¤ort at all. This is why we also introduce a monitoring
mechanism in order to depiste this o¤ending behavior But this one is quite di¤erent from the
one associated to a DF system. It does not penalize illegal dumping, but an infringement to the
contract. The control, therefore, only bear on the people who accept the proposal and not on
all the population ,like in a DF system.
In this paper we however do not want to enter the specic nature of these waste management
contracts (WMC for short). The only thing which is important from the point of view of the
policy maker is that it reduces the treatment cost of the ultimate waste in some proportion.
This is why we assume that such a contract species (i) a proportion of cost reduction to reach
(ii) a payment in compensation and (iii) a probability of being controlled associated to a ne.
We however restrict the set of all contract in the following way. We rst require that the
public agency in charge of the waste destruction works under an ex post budget balancing con-
straint, i.e. the e¤ective waste treatment cost and the monitoring cost must be covered by the
ADF net of the payment to the contractors and perhaps augmented of the collected ne. This
mean that we do not want to levy a specic (lump sum) tax in order to cover the loss of this
agency. Secondly, we do not want to consider contracts that nobody wants to sign. This is why
we also introduce a participation constraint which states that at least some agents are ready
to accept it without cheating. Finally, and since the e¤orts provided by the households are
not observable, we also restrict our attention to WMC which are enforceable, i.e. satisfying an
incentive compatible constraint.
These contracts are implemented in a model constructed in the line of Choe and Fraser [3].
But we depart from this one in several respect. We rst assume that the policy maker has no
opportunity to modify the waste content of a good by taxing the producers. By doing so, we only
deal with ultimate waste produced by the consumers. In counter-part we consider heterogeneous
agents with respect to their willingness to pay for the commodity and their ability to provide an
e¤ort. These characteristics are distributed over a continum of agent but no peculiar assumptions
are imposed on this distribution.
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In this setting we characterize the set of WMC which satises the budget, the participation
and the incentive compatible constraints. In fact we show that we can impose restrictions on
the required waste treatment rate and on the probability of control which are equivalent to the
previous conditions. This characterization gives us the opportunity to study, in a second step,
the welfare properties of these contracts. In this second best world, we essentially show that,
within this set of constraints, a public waste cleaning agency always has an incentive to push
the required waste treatment rate as high as possible and to lower the probability of control in
order to limit the monitoring cost. The rst result is essentially linked to the entrance of poorer
and environment friendlierconsumers into the market. In fact a higher waste treatment rate
requires a higher subsidy, this typically gives the opportunity to poorer consumers to buy the
goods as long as they are not to much a¤ect by the required e¤ort. The second e¤ect works in
the opposite way : a higher rate of control strengthens the budget constraint and induces a lower
subsidy. These preliminary results allow us in a third step to characterize an optimal WMC
from a welfare maximisation point of view. We show that A optimal WMC always contributes
to the reduction of the waste management cost independently from the monitoring cost and that
the optimal policy follows from an arbitrage between the welfare gain relative to a rise in the
required waste treatment rate and the increasing monitoring costs due to its implementation .
The optimal policy is also related to the average cost of the e¤ort in the population. We nally
compare our WMCs to an two-part tari¤ policy consisting in setting both an ADF and a DF.
We essentially show that a WMC is more e¢ cient especially when the total amount of fees is
not smaller then the waste treatment cost.
The paper proceeds as follows : the next section depicts our basic assumptions and describes
a WMC. In section 3, we present the restrictions on the set of these contracts imposed by the
incentive, the participation and the budget balancing constraints. In section 4, we associate to
each feasible contract its level of welfare and give some basic properties of this function. Section
5 is devoted to construction of the optimal contract. In section 6 we compare a WMC to an
two part tari¤ based on a advanced and a disposal fee. Finally, the last section contains some
concluding remarks. The proofs of the di¤erent results are relegated to an appendix.
2 The basic assumptions and the WMC
We consider a commodity produced by a representative rm and sold to a continuum of con-
sumers. Consumption produces ultimate waste, i.e. which cannot be reduced by any kind of
market mechanism like a deposit-refund system nor recycled even partially. For simplicity we
assume that one unit of consumption generates one unit of waste. Its destruction is not free.
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We denote by c the cost of the destruction of one unit of waste.
Since we mainly focus on the consumer behavior, we also largely simplify the behavior of
the representative rm by assuming that (i) the commodity is sold on a competitive market, (ii)
there is no way to reduce the intrinsic waste content at the production level and (iii) the unit
production cost is zero. This means, in other words, that the competitive price p reects the
part of the waste treatment cost which is prepaid by the households and which, in our WMC,
coincides to the unit treatment cost c.
2.1 The demand side
We introduce a continuum of heterogeneous consumers3 who decide to buy or not the good,
i.e. x 2 f0; 1g and su¤er from the intensity of the e¤ort e 2 [0; 1] dedicated to the reduction
of the waste treatment cost. They share the same utility function u(x; e; ) = x   e   
where  denotes the monetary spending. They are nevrtheless heterogeneous in respect to their
willingness to pay  2 [0; A] and to their marginal cost  2 [0;] of the waste treatment e¤ort.
However, in order to make sure that at least one agent is able to consume when the waste
management cost is prepaid, we assume that A > c, and, in the same vein, we say that  > c
otherwise all consumers are willing to provide an e¤ort.
The distribution of these two characteristics across the population is summarized by a prob-
ability distribution over [0; A] [0;] whose cumulated distribution function (c.d.f. for short) is
denoted F (; ). This one is assumed to be absolutely continuous with a strictly positive density
f(; ) := @2;F (; ) > 0. Moreover we denote by f(; ) :=
R 
0 f(; )d the marginal density
of  and by f(a=) := f(;)f(;) the conditional density of  given . A symmetric interpretation
holds for f(; ) and f(=).
Now remember that the e¤ort contributes to the reduction of the waste treatment cost. We
measure the outcome of this activity by the proportion r(e) by which the unit waste treatment
cost is reduced4. We however assume that there is an upper bound r  1 to this proportion and
that this relation is linear, i.e. r(e) = r  e for e 2 [0; 1] : The largest waste management cost
reduction is obtained when the intensity of the e¤ort is maximal. From that point of view we
3The selection of a discrete choice model can perhaps seems restrictive. But in most of the literature, the
authors essentially choose a representative agent economy with continuum of choices. We have the conviction
that our approach is as general as this one since no restrictions are put on the distribution of the characteristics.
From that point of view, we even not transfer to the aggregated behavior the properties related to the optimization
problem of a single agent.
4This assumption particulary ts well in our discrete choice model since a consumer buys at most one unit
and therefore induces a waste treatment cost of at least c. Otherwise one should take into account the amount of
good consumed.
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can say that e(r) = rr denotes the level of e¤ort required to reduce the waste management cost
in a proportion of r 2 [0; r].
2.2 The Waste Management Contract
The mechanism beyond the WMC is the following. We rst implement a full ADF system
in the sense that the waste treatment cost is included in the price of the commodity and the
waste disposal is free. But we give to each household the opportunity to sign a contract which
contributes to the reduction of the waste treatment cost. If she accepts, she has to provide some
e¤ort in order to reach an assigned target, is randomly controlled and receives a reward. For
instance, she can accept the delivering of several bins, commits herself to sort and being reward
proportionally to the amount of sorted waste. This contract therefore tranfers some costly waste
treatment and/or destruction activities from the agency in charge of this task to the consumers
and gives the opportunity to this agency to motivate the household by the gain obtained from
the reduction of the global waste treatment cost.
The simplest way to introduce such a contract in our model is to assume that the waste
treatment agency chooses as target a proportion r 2 [0; r] of cost reduction per unit of treated
waste. She then species, within a contract, a set of task which induces this cost cut, and
proposes a payment s per unit of transformed waste. We even assume for simplicity that the
household can only transform her own waste5.
A monitoring system is however required in order to make sure that the terms of the contract
are fullled or more generally if the cost reduction target r is achieved. So let us denote by  the
probability that a consumer who accepts the contract is controlled and let us introduce a cost
m() per realized control. We assume that this cost is increasing and convex (i.e. m0() > 0 and
m"() > 0) and that the absence of monitoring is free (i.e. m(0) = 0) while perfect motoring is
very expensive (i.e. m(1) > c). It remains to dene the ne f paid by the o¤enders. This one
cannot be too disproportionate to the fault but nevertheless not too low. This is why we decide
to set the ne at the waste treatment cost, i.e. f = c since in our discrete choice model each
consumer only produces one unit of waste.
To summarize, we say that a WMC is described by a triple (r; s; ) given by a cost reduction
target, a subsidy, and a probability of control. Moreover it is important to notice that this
probability of control only applies to the households who accept the contract.
5 In a more general setting, one can even imagine that the environmental friendly consumers, i.e. with a low
, want to transform the waste of their neighborhoods who do not take the contract or even that these contracts
induces a market for waste.
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2.3 The choice of a consumer
In our discrete choice model, if a consumer of type (; ) buys nothing, her utility is nought.
If she purchases the good, she can refuse (utility indexed by 0) the waste reduction contract
and stay in a standard ADF. In this case, she pre-pays the cost c of waste disposal and has
no incentive to make an e¤ort. Under our zero marginal production cost assumption, she pays
p = c for the good and her utility is given by :
u
(;)
0 =   c
If she accepts the contract, she obtains a subsidy of s, but she always has the opportunity either
to execute or not (indexed by e or e ) the terms of the contract. In the rst case she makes the
required e¤ort and delivers the transformed waste. Her utility is therefore given by :
u(;)e (r; s) = (  c) + s  
r
r
Otherwise, she makes no e¤ort but takes the risk of being caught with probability  and of being
charged of a ne of c. We even assume that there is no cost to mask her infringement6 contrary
to the DF litterature which introduces an illegal dumping cost. She therefore obtains :
u
(;)
e (s; ) = (  c) + s  c
From that point of view, the best strategy of a consumer of type (; ) is the one which gives
her the highest payo¤, i.e. which satises
max
n
0; u
(;)
0 ; u
(;)
e (r; s); u
(;)
e (s; )
o
3 The set of feasible contracts
The main purpose of this section is to construct the contracts which can be proposed by the
policy maker and which have the property that (i) all agents who accept the contract have
enough incentives to realize the required cost reduction target (ii) at least some agents are
willing to participate in the program, and (iii) the waste treatment agency covers both the
waste management and the monitoring costs.
6 It is always possible to introduce such a cost into the model but this does not really change the results. It
gives to the waste treatment agency the opportunity to increase the subsidy, to require a higher e¤ort and/or to
reduce the probability of control without breaking the incentive constraint.
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The rst condition can be dened quite easily. We simply require that cheating is for everybody
the worsts choice.
Denition 1 The Incentive Constraint (IC) is satised i¤
8 (; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] , max
n
u(;)e (r; s); u
(;)
0 ; 0
o
 u(;)e (s; ) (IC)
In order to dene the participation constraint, we need to dene what we means by "some
agents" accept the contract. Since we work with a continuum of agents, we simply require
that there must be a subset E of agents with non zero measure which accepts the contract and
perform the e¤ort. So if P (E) denotes the proportion of these households, we say that :
Denition 2 The Participation Constraint (PC) is veried i¤
9E  [0; A] [0;] ;and P (E) > 0 such that :
8(; ) 2 E; u(;)e (r; s) = max
n
0; u
(;)
0 ; u
(;)
e (r; s); u
(;)
e (r; )
o
(PC)
The construction of the budget constraint requires some additional notations. So let us denote
by P (0) and P ( E) the proportion of households buying the good who respectively refuse the
contract, and cheat7. Moreover let us remember that in our discrete choice model each consumer
only produces one unit of waste, it follows that the advance disposal fees collected per unit
of waste is described by

(P ( E) + P (E) + P (0))  c while the waste treatment cost is given
by

(P ( E) + P (0))  c+ P (E)  (1  r)  c since a proportion P ( E) of the households do not
respect the contract. The subsidies paid to the agents are nevertheless of

(P ( E) + P (E))  s.
Concerning the monitoring activity, the controls at a rate of  only apply to the population of
contractor and costs therefore

  (P ( E) + P (E)) m() but they generate nes which render
  P ( E)  c. It follows that the budget constraint is given by :
P (E)  (s  r  c+  m()) + P ( E)  (s    c+  m())  0
But, we can even go a step further. Let us remember that the subsidy s acts, for each consumer,
like a discount on the price of the good. From that point of view and whatever  and r are,
any waste treatment agency which seeks for a contract which maximize the total surplus always
exhaust this constraint. This is why we can say :
7These probabilities of course depend of all the parameters of the model. We omit them in order to keep the
notations rather simple.
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Denition 3 The Balancing Budget Constraint (BBC) is satised i¤
P (E) (s  r  c+  m()) + P ( E) (s    c+  m()) = 0 (BBC)
It becomes now important to identify the set of contracts which satises these three condi-
tions. If IC and PC are veried, we knows respectively that P (E) > 0 and P ( E) = 0, this
means under BBC that the subsidy s = r  c  m(). We can even go a step further. At least
from an intuitive point of view we can guess that if this subsidy is negative, surely nobody wants
to participate to the waste management program. On the other hand, if this one is too high,
especially if it is higher than the expected cost of the ne, i.e. s >   c, the households would
have an incentive accept the contract and to cheat. This clearly imposes an upper an a lower
bound on the subsidy. We can even say that the lowez bound must be strictly positive unless
r =  = 0; otherwise it would be impossible to nd an open set8 E on which PC is satised.
This is why we can say that :
Lemma 1 If IC; PC, and BBC are satised then (i) s = r c  m(), (ii) r c  m() > 0
except for r =  = 0 and (iii) r  c   m()    c
But what is more interesting for us is that these conditions are not only necessary but also
su¢ cient. In fact we can say that :
Proposition 1 The set of feasible contracts (i.e. satisfying BBC, PC, and IC) is fully charac-
terized by the three previous conditions. In other words the subsidy is given by s = r c  m()
and the required rate r of reduction of the waste treatment cost and the probability  of control
belong to :
F =

(r; ) 2 [0; r] [0; 1] :  m()
c
< r    (m() + c)
c

[ f(0; 0)g
Finally and since we restrict, up to now, our attention to feasible contracts, let us observe
that u(;)e (r; s) and u
(;)
e (s; ) can be, in this case, written as respectively :(
u
(;)
e (r; ) = (  c) + (r  c   m())   rr
u
(;)
e (r; ) = (  c) + (r  c   m())  c
8Since our distribution of probability is absolutely continous, only sets containing an open set have non-zero
probability.
9
4 The surplus and its basic properties
Since we have assumed that there is a public agency which is in charge of the destruction of
this ultimate waste, she will propose a feasible contract which maximises the surplus of the
consumers. So let us now derive the surplus associated to each feasible contract.
In order to compute the one, we essentially concentrate our attention on non-trivial feasible
contracts, i.e. with (r; ) 6= (0; 0). This last case simply corresponds to a full ADF system in
which the average surplus is given by
R 
0
R A
c u
(;)
0 dF . Moreover, to perform this computation,
it becomes also important to distinguish the set of people who buy the commodity and accept
the contract from those who refuse it. This rst set of households is given by :
C(r; ) =
(
(; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] : u(;)e (r; ) 
(1)
u
(;)
0 
(2)
0
)
A simple computation shows that condition (1) is equivalent to  rr  c  r   m() or in other
words that :
  (r; ) := r

c   m()
r

Since condition (2) must be satised, we also observe that :
8  (r; );   (r; ; ) := r
r
+  m() + (1  r)  c
Moreover, it is immediate that (r; ; ) 2 [ m() + (1  r)  c; c]  [0; A] and (r; ) 2 [0;]
since c <  and r  1. We can therefore say that :
C(r; ) = f(; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] : 0    (r; ) and   (r; ; )g
It follows that the surplus computed on the population which buy the good and accept the
contract is given by9 :
SC(r; ) =
Z
C(r;)
u(;)e (r; )dF =
Z (r;)
0
 Z A
(r;;)
u(;)e (r; )f(=)d
!
f(; )d
Let us now move to the surplus of the set of households who buy the commodity but do not
9 In order to prevent any confusion, let us notice that this quantity is not the average surplus of the consumers
who buy the good and execute the contract. If the reader is interesting in this quantity, he must divide this
surplus by the probability of being in this set, that is P [C(r; )].
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accept the contract. The set of these agents is described by10 :
C(r; ) =
(
(; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] : u(;)0 
(1)
u(;)e (r; ) 
(2)
0
)
By (1) we can say that   (r; ) and by (2) that   c. Their surplus therefore corresponds
to :
S C(r; ) =
Z
C(r;)
u
(;)
0 dF =
Z 
(r;)
Z A
c
u
(;)
0 (r; )f(=)d

f(; )d
It follows that the total surplus is simply given by
S(r; ) := SC(r; ) + S C(r; )
We even observe that :
Remark 1 Since the total surplus under a full ADF system (i.e.(r; ) = (0; 0)) is given
R 
0
R A
c u
(;)
0 dF ,
we can say S(r; )  R 0 R Ac u(;)0 dF and if the budget balancing subsidy s = c  r    m() is
strictly positive then this inequality holds strictly. A full ADF system is therefore always at least
weakly dominated by a non trivial and e¢ cient waste treatment contract.
Let us now spell out comparative static properties of a feasible WMC. First, if the monitoring
probability  increases, we know that the budget balancing subsidy s = cr c() automatically
decreases. We can thus conclude, at least from an intuitive point of view, that the welfare of the
consumers who have adopted the waste management contract decreases, the same being true for
the total surplus.
The e¤ect of a change of the required waste treatment rate r is however less obvious. On the
one hand, an increase in r contributes to a higher subsidy s: This provides, for the households
who buy the good, more incentives to accept the contract and gives the opportunity to new
consumers to enter the market. Yet, on the other hand, this also implies that the consumers
who accept the contract provide a higher level of e¤ort. We nevertheless show that this increase
of the e¤ort is o¤set by the increase of the price cut. More formally, we say that :
Proposition 2 Let us denote by P (r; ) :=
R (r;)
0
R A
(r;;) dF the proportion of households who
accept the waste management contract and by (r; ) :=
R (r;)
0
R A
(r;;) 
dF
P (r;) their average
marginal desutility of the e¤ort. We observe that :
10Since we have assumed that our measure is absolutely continuous, we decide by convention to only use weak
inequalities.
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(i) 8(r; ) 2 F and (r; ) 6= (0; 0), @S(r; ) =  (m0() + m())P (r; ) < 0, i.e. when the
probability of control increases, the consumers surplus decreases.
(ii) 8(r; ) 2 F and (r; ) 6= (0; 0), @rS(r; ) =

c  (r;)r

P (r; ) > 0 i.e. the surplus
increases with the required waste treatment rate r since for all consumers who accept the
contract, the subsidy, c  r  m() is always greater than the monetary evaluation of the
e¤ort  rr . This implies that c >

r for all these consumers, and it follows that c >
(r;)
r .
5 The optimal WMC
Let us now try to characterize the optimal WMC. As usual in a second best situation, the social
planner tries to implement the feasible contract which maximizes the total surplus, i.e. she
chooses :
(r; ) 2 argmax
(r;)2F
Z
C(r;)
u(;)e (r; )dF +
Z
C(r;)
u
(;)
0 dF| {z }
S(r;)
(1)
Moreover by the early denition of feasible contracts (see proposition 1) and the fact that S(r; )
is increasing in r (see proposition 2), it is obvious that the upper constraint on r wil by binding.
We can therefore reduce the set F to
F 0 =

(r; ) 2 [0; r] [0; 1] : r = min

  (m() + c)
c
; r

This is clearly a closed subset of the compact set [0; r] [0; 1], hence a compact set. Since S(r; )
is also a continuous function, we can say without ambiguity that :
Lemma 2 There always exists an optimal WMC which solves the previous program
But it could also be interesting to spell out the di¤erent properties of this optimal VMC.
So let us rst concentrate our attention to the constraint F 0. Since the surplus is decreasing in
, an optimal WMC can never by such that (m(
)+c)
c > r, because, in this case, it possible
to reduce the monitoring cost without modifying the cost reduction target r. We can therefore
forgetthe min in the denition on F 0. Since we have also assumed that monitoring cost are
large when everybody is controled, i.e. m(1) > c, we can say because (m()+c)c is increasing
that
Proposition 3 The following properties hold :
(i) The probability of control is bounded from above by sup < 1 which solves
sup(m(sup)+c)
c = r
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(ii) The optimal strategy corresponds to a situation in which the subsidy is equal to the cost of
a cheating strategy i.e. s = r  c   m() =   c.
(iii) we can associate to each r 2 [0; r] a unique probability of control (r) with the property that
the subsidy corresponds to the cost of cheating.
From that point of view, especially by using (iii), we can replace our constrained optimization
problem by an unconstrained one by replacing the probability of control by (r), which solves
r  c  m() =   c. In other words, we can say that the optimal cost reduction target is given
by :
r 2 argmax
r2[0;r]
Z
C(r;)
u(;)e (r; (r))dF +
Z
C(r;)
u
(;)
0 dF| {z }
S(r;(r))
This brings us to the conclusion that :
Proposition 4 At an optimal WMC (r; ), on observes that :
(i) both the target r and the probability of control  are strictly positive.
(ii) the household who accept the contract receives a strictly positive subsidy s = rc m() >
0
(iii) the following marginal condition is satised :
c 
 (r; )
r

  ( m0() +m())  d
dr

r
 0 with equality when r < r
In order to comment this last condition let us rst remember that  (r; ) is the average
of the repartion of the marginal disutility of the e¤ort across the households who accept the
WMC, so that
(r;)
r stands for the average marginal cost of an increase in the rate r of waste
treatment. But we also notice that c  ( m0()+m())  ddr

r is nothing else then marginal
benet from accepting a WMC since this quantity is the derivative of the subsidy, i.e. ds(r;(r))dr ,
this marginal benet being the same for all households who accept the contract. From that
point of view, the previous marginal condition can be written as
ds(r; (r))
dr

 (r; )
r
with equality when r < r
and simply states that on average the marginal gain must be equal to the marginal costs when
an optimum is reached.
If we now come back to (r; ) := r

c  m()r

which was dened as the highest disutility of
the e¤ort for which a WMC can be accepted, we can note that (r; )  rc. As a consequence, we
can say that the average value of this disutility  (r; ) < rc, or, in other words, 8r; (r;(r))r < c.
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If one now has in mind, under our assumptions, that the marginal monitoring costs are small
when  is close to 0, i.e. (  m0() + m())  ddr

r ' 0 for r close to 0, we can say the
marginal benet ds(r;(r))dr ' c. This is why r is always strictly positive. From that point of
view, any WMC is better in term of welfare then a ADF since this contract coincides to a trivial
WMC for which r =  = 0
6 A WMC versus a Two Part Tari¤
At that point, we know that a WMC challenges a pure ADF. But is this contract better then a
two part tari¤ (TPT) build on both an ADF and a DF ?
The answer to this question is less obvious because these two mechanisms are quite di¤erent.
On the one hand, the rst enforces a level of e¤ort since the contract explicitly spells the cost
reducing activities while a DF system leaves this choice to the household. But, one the other
hand, this contractual agreement simplies the monitoring activity since the controller only
look for infringements to the contract within the population who signed it, while in the other
case, each consumer has an incentive to illegally dump their waste. So even, if a TPT provides
more freedom for the household, its implementation is probably more expensive in terms of
monitoring.
Even is this issue is important, we nevertheless assume, for simplicity, that the monitoring
cost m() per control is the same in both systems. In the context, we basically that an optimal
WMC always dominated a TPT as long as the total amount of per unit fees11 (i.e. ADF+DF) is
not smaller then the unit waste treatment cost. Moreover, if this last condition is not satised,
we even show that we can replicates the welfare e¤ect of a TPT by a suitable WMC which is not
necessary incentive compatible but which reduces the total waste treatment cost (i.e. including
the global monitoring cost). We even argue that a TPT is this case not really fair since it induces
a transfer of wealth from the household who provide an e¤ort to those who do nothing at all.
In order to illustrate this point, let us rst introduce a TPT in our model. This one will
be characterized by a triple (a; d; ) which species the ADF, noted by a, included in the price
of the commodity, the DF, noted by d, charged for unit of waste, and the probability  that
a household will be controlled for illegal dumping. The utility function of a household of type
(; ) remains unchanged and is always given by :
u(x; e; ) = x  e   with x = f0; 1g and e 2 [0; 1]
11Remember that we have assumed that one unit of good produces one unit of waste. From that point of view,
the ADF which is basically charged on consumption can be compared with a DF charged on the amount of waste.
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But, the e¤ort and therefore level of waste reduction is now endogenous. This is why we
explicitly have to pay attention to illegal dumping, to introduce a individual waste production
function and to compute the cost of consumption. Concerning the rst point, we note by f the
proportion of waste which is illegally disposed, the monitoring cost m() per control as well as
the ne remain the same. The waste production function must however be consistent with the
cost reduction function introduced in section 2, this one is therefore given by min fx  r  e; 0g.
From that point of view, the expected cost of consumption is for each agent given by :
C(x; e; f) = a  x+ ((1  f)  d+ f  c  ) min fx  r  e; 0g
with x = f0; 1g ; e 2 [0; 1] , and f 2 [0; 1]
and each household chooses (x; e; f) in order to maximize u(x; e; C(x; e; f)).
If we now take the point of view of a public agency in charge of the waste treatment, it is
immediate that the DF must verify d  c  because in this case the households depose her waste
legally, i.e. choose f = 0. But this agency has also an incentive to minimize her monitoring
cost and therefore to set the probability of control at  = dc . This is why we concentrate our
attention on TPTs given by (a; d; dc ). Moreover, as for a WMC, we also require that this agency
is subject to a budget constraint in the sense that the collected fees must cover the monitoring
and the waste treatment costs. This last cost can even be evaluated easily since the utility of
each buyer is linear in e¤ort. In fact she sets e = 1 or e = 0 respectively when   d  r or
 < d  r. From that point of we can summarize all our observations in the following lemma :
Lemma 3 Let (a; d; ) be a TPT, we can say that :
(i) When  = dc , this TPT prevents from illegal dumping and minimizes for a given couple (a; d)
the monitoring cost.
(ii) The indirect expected utility of a consumer of type (; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] is given by V (;)TPT =
max f0;   (a+ d) + max fd  r   ; 0gg
(iii) If p(a; d) denotes the proportion of the e¤ective buyers who perform a waste reduction e¤ort,
the budget constraint per e¤ective buyer is satised when a+ d  c+ dcm
 
d
c
  r (c  d) p(a; d)
Let us now compare both systems. For that purpose, we associate to a given TPT (a; d; dc ) a
WMC characterized by (r; s; ) = (r; c  (a+ d) + rd; r dc ), i.e. with the property that the target
of the reduction of the cost is r, the subsidy is given by s = c  (a+ d)+ rd, and the probability
of control is  = r dc . Under this WMC, the consumer has, as usually, only four options : he can
do nothing, only buy the good, buy it and accept WMC, and nally buy it, accept the contract
and cheat. Moreover, if we refer to section 3.3, the indirect utility of the household of type (; )
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is, in this case, given by :
V
(;)
WMC = max
n
0; u
(;)
0 ; u
(;)
e (r; s); u
(;)
e (s; )
o
= max f0;   c;      (a+ d) + rd;   (a+ d)g
= max f0;  min fc; a+ dg+max frd  ; 0gg
From this last equation, it is immediate that this WMC improves the utility of all agents as long
as the total amount of per unit fees (i.e. ADF+DF) is not smaller then the waste treatment
cost, i.e. when a + d  c. Under this condition, we can even show that this WMC is in our
feasible set. But we can associates such a WMC to each TPT. This therefore means that an
optimal WMC always beats, from a welfare point of view, an optimal TPT as long as for this
last one a+ d  c. The results are however less clear cut in the other case. In fact we can say :
Proposition 5 Let (a; d; dc ) be a TPT which satises the budget constraint and let (r; c  (a+
d) + rd; r dc ) be an associated WMC. We can say :
(i) If a + d  c, this WMC dominates in term of welfare the TPT. This contract satises both
(PC) and (IC) and spares money since the budget of the waste treatment agency is in excess.
(ii) If a welfare maximizing TPT veries a + d  c, then this one is strictly dominated by the
optimal WMC.
(iii) If, a + d < c the WMC associated to a TPT allocates the utilities in the same way. This
contract does not verify (IC) but nevertheless satisfy (PC) and spare money with respect to the
TPT.
But let us quickly come back to the case where a TPT veries a+ d < c. In this situation,
each household of type  > a + d and   rd supplies no e¤ort at all and support a total
fee of (a + d) which is strictly smaller the cost c of the treatment of her waste. This is why
our WMC which replicates the TPT is not able to guaranty that the terms of the contract are
always fulllled because these agents, under a WMC, always accept the contract and cheat, i.e.
V
(;)
WMC = u
(;)
e (s; ). But this also means that these consumers free rides their obligations in
a TPT because they benet from a reduced waste treatment cost by doing nothing. In other
words, they benets from the e¤ort of the more environmental friendly agent which contributes
to a reduction of the total waste treatment cost. In this case, a TPT is therefore not really fair.
By contrast, this situation never occurs when a Incentive Compatible WMC is implemented
since the people who refuse the contract support the total waste treatment cost.
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7 Concluding remarks
In the paper, we essentially addressed the question of reduction of the cost induced by the
treatment of the ultimate waste produced by the consumers. But ultimate waste, we mean
the residual garbage for which there exists no recycling opportunities stimulated by a suitable
taxation scheme. This onr, even if it cannot be totally destroyed, often requires additional
costly transformations before being, say, reintroduced in our environment. Since these costs are
supported by the society, and especially the consumers, the idea of this paper was essentially
to look at a mechanism which implicates these agents in the reduction of this treatment cost
(instead of reduction of the amount of waste) by providing some voluntary e¤ort. More precisely,
we introduced what we called a Waste Management Contract. In this setting, the households are
charged of an ADF which covers the waste treatment cost but have nevertheless the opportunity
to accept a WMC which species a set of cost reducing activities which can be performed at
their level and for which they earn a subsidy. This contract was also coupled with a monitoring
scheme in order to prevent infringements. In this context, we rst identied the set of feasible
contracts, i.e. those satisfying an Incentive, a Participation and a Budget Balancing constraints,
then we characterized an optimal contract from a welfare point of view, and nally compare this
kind of agreement to a more standard system which couples an ADF and a DF.
This paper however remains particular in several respects. First, even if our argument
requires no specic assumptions on the distribution of the characteristics of agents and remains
quite general from that point of view, we however assumed that (i) the e¤ect of the e¤ort on
the cost reduction rate is linear, and (ii) that the preferences of each agent remain linear. It
could perhaps be interesting to relax these assumptions by introducing a more general relation
between the e¤ort and its e¤ect on the waste treatment cost, or even to leave our discrete choice
setting.
From a less technical point of view, the reader surely also notices that we basically concen-
trate our attention to waste management policies which handle the treatment of end-of-pipe
pollution.. Recyclable and incentives which reduces the waste content of a good are not explicitly
taken into consideration. This of course requires a more global model, but is not without conse-
quences especially if the households have to allocate a limited e¤ort between the cost reducing
activities prescribed by a WMC and a standard recycling behavior motivated by a deposit-refund
system. We however leave this point to future works.
Finally we have also assumed, as usual in this literature, that the market of the good works
competitively. If this assumption is relaxed, the optimal design of the contract not only takes
into account the waste management issue but also its e¤ects on market power. In this case,
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we are typically in he situation in which one instrument, i.e. the WMC, tries to regulates two
ine¢ cencies : the imperfect observability of the e¤ort and the existence of a behavior of the
rms which try to extract the rent of imperfect competition.
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APPENDIX
A Proof of lemma 1
Step 1 BBC; IC; PC ) (i) s = r  c   m()
Since IC and PC respectively induces that P (E) > 0, i.e. at least some consumers accect the contract, and
P ( E) = 0, i.e. nobody cheats, the result directly follows from BBC.
Step 2 BBC; IC; PC ) (ii) r  c   m() > 0 except for r =  = 0
Let us rst verify that ((i) and non(ii))) non(PC). In fact if (i) is true, u(;)e (r; s) and u(;)e (s; ) can be
written as respectively : (
u
(;)
e (r; ) = (  c) + (r  c   m())   rr
u
(;)
e (r; ) = (  c) + (r  c   m())  c
(2)
So if r  c    m()  0 and (r; ) 6= (0; 0) then 8(; ) 2 [0; A]  ]0;], u(;)0 =    c > u(;)e (r; ). Since
this implies that max
n
0; u
(;)
0 ; u
(;)
e (r; )
o
> u
(;)
e (r; s), PC can only be veried for a subset of [0; A]  f0g,
a set which contains no open subsets. But our probability distribution is absolutely continuous (i.e. only sets
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containing open sets has a strictly positive probability), it follows that PC cannot be true. But this preliminary
observation leads us also to the conclusion (by contraposition) that PC ) (non(i) or (ii)). But by step 1,
(BBC; IC; PC)) (i), hence we can say that BBC; IC; PC ) (ii)
Step 3 BBC; IC; PC ) (iii) r  c   m()    c
As in step 2, if we show that ((i) and non(iii))) non(IC) our result is obtained. It therefore remains to nd
an agent (; ) with the property that u(;)e (r; ) > max
n
u
(;)
e (r; ); u
(;)
0 ; 0
o
. So let us set (; ) = (A;).
Since (i) is true we can use (2) and because A > c and non(iii); we observe that u(A;)e (r; ) > u
(A;)
0 > 0. It
therefore remains to verify that u(A;)e (r; ) > u
(A;)
e (r; ). So let observe that :
u
(A;)
e (r; ) = (A  c) + (r  c   m())    c
> (A  c) + (r  c   m())  r  c
(
since non(iii) and  m() > 0
imply that r  c >   c
)
= (A  c) + (r  c   m())  r
r
 (r  c)
> (A  c) + (r  c   m())  r
r
 since  > c and r  1
= u(A;)e (r; )
B Proof of proposition 1
Remark : In this proof, (i), (ii) and (iii) referee to the property exhibited in lemma 1.
Step 1 : ((i) and (iii))) IC
Let us rst notice that under (i), u(;)e (r; ) is dened by (2). So if (iii) holds, we have
8 2 [0; A] u(;)0 =   c    c+ r  c   m()    c = u(;)e (r; )
It follows, by the denition of a maximum, that :
8 (; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] , max
n
u(;)e (r; s); u
(;)
0 ; 0
o
 u(;)e (s; ) (IC)
Step 2 : ((i) and (iii))) BBC
By step 1, we know that IC is true. It follows that P ( E) = 0 and since (i) is veried we can write that
P (E) (s  (1  r)c+  m()) + P ( E) (s    c+  m()) = 0 (BBC)
Step 3 : ((i), (ii) and (iii))) PC
Let us rst observe that under (i), u(;)e (r; ) and u
(;)
e (r; ) are given by (2). Moreover by (ii) we typically
have to sub-case one in which r =  = 0 and one in which s = (r  c   m()) > 0 and (r; ) 6= (0; 0), In the
rst one, (PC) is obviously satised since
8 (; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] u(;)0 = u(;)e (r; ) = u(;)e (r; )
Now let us move to the second one. Since A > c, we can say that 8 (; ) 2 E = ]c; A[ 0; r
r
s

u(;)e (r; ) = (  c) + s   r
r
>   c = u(;)0 > 0
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But we also know that ((i) and (iii))) IC, or in other words that :
8 (; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] ; max
n
u(;)e (r; s); u
(;)
0 ; 0
o
 u(;)e (s; )
By using the previous equation we conclude that :
8 (; ) 2 E = ]c; A[
i
0;
r
r
s
h
, u(;)e (r; s) > max
n
u
(;)
e (s; ); u
(;)
0 ; 0
o
C Proof of proposition 2
This computation is a tedious exercise since S(r; ) = SC(r; ) + S C(r; ) with8<: SC(r; ) =
R (r;)
0
R A
(r;;)
u
(;)
e (r; )f(=)d

f(; )d
S C(r; ) =
R 
(r;)
R A
c
u
(;)
0 f(=)d

f(; )d
But the reader observes that r and  work in a rather similar way. So if x stand either for r and , we obtain
that :
@xS(r; ) = @xSC(r; ) + @xS C(r; ) =  Z A
(r;;)
u(;)e (r; )  f(=)d
!
f(; )
!
=(r;)
 @x(r; ) (3a)
+
Z (r;)
0
 Z A
(r;;)
@xu
(;)
e (r; )f(=)d 

u(;)e (r; )f(=)

=(r;;)
@x(r; ; )
!
f(; )d
(3b)
 
Z A
c
u
(;)
0  f(=)d

f(; )

=(r;)
 @x(r; ) (3c)
Since (r; ) = r

c  m()
r

and (r; ; ) := r
r
+ c  (rc m()), we also remark that :
8>><>>:
(i) u(;)e (r; )

=(r;)
=   (1  r)  c   m()  r

c  m()
r

r
r
=   c = u(;)0

=(r;)
(ii) (r; ; )j=(r;) = r

c  m()
r

r
r
+ c  (rc  m()) = c
(iii) u(;)e (r; )

=(r;;)
=  r
r
+ c  (rc  m())  (1  r)  c    c()   r
r
= 0
By (i) and (ii) the rst (3a) and the third (3c) term in the preceding sum simplify, and (iii) reduces the second
(3b). We can therefore say that :
@xS(r; ) =
Z (r;)
0
 Z A
(r;;)
@xu
(;)
e (r; )  f(=)d
!
f(; )d
Now remember that @u
(;)
e (r; ) =  (m0() +m()) < 0 for all  > 0 and that the only feasible contract
for which  = 0 is (r; ) = (0; 0), we can therefore say that :
8(r; ) 2 F and (r; ) 6= (0; 0), @S(r; ) =  (m0() +m())
Z (r;)
0
Z A
(r;;)
dF < 0
where
R (r;)
0
R A
(r;;)
dF = P (r; ) the proportion of households who accept the waste management contract.
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This proves (i) of proposition 2.
Let us move to (ii) of proposition 2. Since e(r) = r
r
, we observe that @ru
(;)
e (r; ) = c   r . Moreover
8 < (r; ) =: r

c  m()
r

, we can say that :
c  
r
> c  r

c   m()
r

1
r
=
  c()
r
 0
This implies that :
8(r; ) 2 F and (r; ) 6= (0; 0), @rS(r; ) =
Z (r;)
0

c  
r
 Z A
(r;;)
f(=)d
!
f(; )d > 0
Now let us denote by
(r; ) :=
Z (r;)
0

R A
(r;;)
f(=)d

R (r;)
0
R A
(r;;)
dF
f(; )d
the average desutility of the e¤ort for the households who accept the waste management contract. This yields :
8(r; ) 2 F and (r; ) 6= (0; 0), @rS(r; ) =

c 
(r; )
r

P (r; )
D Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is obvious since the surplus S(r; ) is continuous and the set F of feasible contracts is compact.
E Proof of proposition 3
Remember that (r; ) 2 argmax
(r;)2F0
S(r; ) with F 0 =
n
(r; ) 2 [0; r] [0; 1] : r = min
n
(m()+c)
c
; r
oo
Point (i) : 9sup < 1 given by sup(m(sup)+c)c = r such that   sup
Let us rst verify that sup exists and smaller then 1. To see this, let us observe that f() =
(m()+c)
c
is increasing in  and let us remember that we have assumed that m(0) = 0 and m(1) > c. The range of f is
therefore given by f ([0; 1]) = [0; f(1)] with f(1) > 2. Since r 2 [0; 1], there always exists a unique sup(r) < 1
solving
sup(m(sup)+c)
c
= r
Now let us verify that   sup. Assume the contrary. Since f 0() > 0, it is immediate by the denition of
F 0 that r = r. But the same holds for 0 = +sup
2
< . Now remember by proposition 2 that @S(r; ) < 0,
it follows that S(r; 0) > S(r; ) which contradicts the fact that (r; ) is an optimal solution.
Point (ii) : s = r  c   m() =   c.
Since f 0() > 0, by step 1 we know that f()  f(sup) = r. It follows by the denition of F 0, that
r =
(m()+c)
c
or in other words that r  c   m() =   c
Point (iii) : 9 : [0; r]! [0; sup], with the property that r = (r)(m((r))+c)c .
The same arguments as in the rst part of the proof of step 1 apply.
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F Proof of proposition 4
Since the search of an optimal contract reduces to the computation of a waste reduction rate which satises
r 2 argmax
0rr
S(r; (r)):
Point (i) : r 6= 0
Let us compute limr!0 @rS(r; (r)). We observe by proposition 2 that
lim
r!0
@rS(r; (r)) = lim
r!0

@rS(r; )j=(r)

+ lim
r!0

@S(r; )j=(r)

 lim
r!0
d(r)
dr
with
@rS(r; ) =

c 
(r; )
r

P (r; ) @S(r; ) =  (m0() +m())P (r; )
d
dr
=
c
(r) m0((r)) +m((r)) + c
Now remember that m() is increasing and convex, it follows that lim!0 m0() is bounded. Since P (r; (r)) 2
[0; 1] ; m(0) = 0 and (0) = 0, we can state that limr!0 @S(r; (r)) = 0. But we can also observe that
d
dr
= c
(r)m0((r))+m((r))+c 2 [0; 1], so, by continuity, the same holds for limr!0
d
dr
. We can therefore say (see
proof of proposition 2) that :
lim
r!0
@rS(r; (r)) = lim
r!0

@rS(r; )j=(r)

=
Z limr!0 (r;(r))
0

c  
r
 Z A
limr!0 (r;(r);)
f(=)d
!
f(; )d
Now let us observe that :
(i) limr!0 (r; (r); ) = limr!0
 
 r
r
+ (r) m((r)) + (1  r)  c = c
(ii) limr!0 (r; (r)) = limr!0 r

c  (r)m((r))
r

= rc since by Lhôpitals rule
lim
r!0
(r) m((r))
r
= lim
r!0
 
m((r)) + (r)m0((r))
 d
dr
= 0
(remember that lim!0 m0() is bounded and ddr 2 [0; 1])
We can therefore say that
lim
r!0
@rS(r; (r)) =
Z rc
0

c  
r
Z A
c
f(=)d

f(; )d
But we have assume that F is absolutely continuous with strictly positive density, hence
R A
c
f(=)d

> 0 and
f(; ) > 0. We deduce that
lim
r!0
@rS(r; (r)) >
Z rc
0

c  rc
r
Z A
c
f(=)d

f(; )d = 0
From that point of view, it is impossible that r = 0
Point (ii) : s = (r)c > 0
This follows directly from point (ii) of proposition 3 and the fact that r > 0
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Point (iii) : the marginal condition
Since r > 0, we know from the Kuhn-Tucker rst order conditions that :8<: @rS(r; (r)) + @S(r; (r))
d
dr
   = 0
 (r   r) = 0 r   r  0   0
or equivalently that
@rS(r; (r)) + @S(r; (r))
d
dr
 0 with equality if r < r
By replacing the di¤erent derivatives by their value we nally obtain :
c 
(r; )
r
  (m0() +m())d
dr

P (r; )  0 with equality if r < r
G Proof of Lemma 3
Let us remember that  = d
c
and that each consumer solves
max
(x;e;f)2f0;1g[0;1][0;1]
x  e  x  ((1  f)  d+ f  c  ) min fx  r  e; 0g
Point (i) :  = d
c
If  = d
c
, the consumer is indi¤erent between all value of f , hence f = 1 is an optimal strategy.
Point (ii) : 8(; ) 2 [0; A] [0;], V (;)TPT = max f0;   (a+ d) + max fd  r   ; 0gg
If  = d
c
, the previous program becomes :
max
(x;e;f)2f0;1g[0;1]
x  e  x  d min fx  r  e; 0g
So if x = 0, we can say that e = 0 is the optimal e¤ort and the indirect utility is given V (;)(0) = 0. If
x = 1, the optimal e¤ort will be respectively e = 1 or e = 0 when   r  d or  > r  d. It follows that
V (;)(1) =    a   d + max fr  d  ; 0g. Since each consumer chooses the best solution between both we can
conclude that :
V (;) = f  a  d+max fr  d  ; 0g ; 0g
Point (iii) : the budget constraint is a+ d  c+ d
c
m
 
d
c
  r (c  d) p(a; d)
The waste cleaning agency collects a ADF for each unit of good sold on the market, a complete disposal fee
paid by the households who perform no e¤ort and a reduced fee for those who set their e¤ort at e = 1: Since
 = d
c
, no nes are collected. From that point of view, she obtains on average par e¤ective buyer :
a+ d  (1  p(a; d)) + d  (1  r)  p(a; d)
where p(a; d) denote the proportion of e¤ective buyers who provide an e¤ort. But she needs to cover (i) the total
waste management cost for the households who do no e¤ort, (ii) a reduced cost for those who reduce her amount
of waste, and (iiii) the monitoring cost by having in mind that  = d
c
and that the control applies to all the
e¤ective buyers. She therefore spends on average par e¤ective buyer :
c  (1  p(a; d)) + c  (1  r)  p(a; d) + d
c
m

d
c

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If follows, after rearrangement, that the budget constraint is given by :
a+ d  c+ d
c
m

d
c

  r (c  d) p(a; d)
H Proof of proposition 5
Point (i) : 8(; ), V (;)WMC  V (;)TPT and WMC satises (PC), (IC) and leave the budget in excess.
If a+ d  c, the rst result is obvious since :(
V
(;)
TPT = max f0;   (a+ d) + max fd  r   ; 0gg
V
(;)
WMC = max f0;  min fc; a+ dg+max frd  ; 0gg
(PC) is also satised since each consumers characterized by   rd is willing to sign the contract. Now observe
that
u
(;)
e (s; ) =   (a+ d)    c = u(;)0
It follows that cheating is always a dominated strategy, hence (IC) is true.
Let us now move to the budget constraint. The agency collects c per e¤ective buyer and spends (i) the
total waste treatment cost for buyers who refuse the contract, (ii) the subsidy which is paid to the agents who
accept the WMC, (iii) the remaining waste treatment cost for these agents, and (iv) the monitoring cost of the
households who accept the contract. So if we denote by pC(a; d) the proportion of buyers which refuse the WMC,
we can say that the budget constraint, per e¤ective buyer, is given by :
c  c  pC(a; d) + (c  (a+ d) + rd)  (1  pC(a; d))
+(1  r)  c  (1  pC(a; d)) + r d
c
m

r
d
c

 (1  pC(a; d))
By rearranging this expression, we obtain :
a+ d  c+ r d
c
m

r
d
c

  r (c  d)
But we know that the related TPT satises the budget constraint. Hence by lemma 3, we can say that budget is
in excess since :
a+ d  c+ d
c
m

d
c

  r (c  d) p(a; d)
 c+ d
c
m

d
c

  r (c  d) since p(a; d)  1
> c+ r
d
c
m

r
d
c

  r (c  d) since r < 1 and m();m0() > 0
Point (ii) : if a+ d  c, the optimal WMC strictly dominates the optimal TPT
Obvious, if one distributes the budget in excess by increasing the subsidy.
Point (iii) : a+ d < c
By the early denition of V (;)TPT and V
(;)
WMC , we immediately 8(; ), V (;)WMC = V (;)TPT . The utility allocation
is therefore the same under both mechanisms. A similar argument as is point (i) makes sure that (IC) is true.
But (IC) is not satised since 8 (; ) such that  > a+ d and  > rd we have V (;)WMC = u(;)e (s; ), i.e. cheating
is optimal. Moreover, since both mechanisms allocates the same utility, the proportion of the e¤ective buyers
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who perform a waste reduction e¤ort is same and is equal to p(a; d). Let us now move to the budget constraint.
Its computation is similar to point (i), we simply has to take into account (i) that a ne is collected and (ii) that
every buyer is controlled and perceives a subsidy. We obtain the following constraint per unit of e¤ective buyers.
c+ (1  p(a; d)) 

r
d
c

 c  c  (1  p(a; d)) + (c  (a+ d) + rd) + (1  r)  c  (p(a; d)) + r d
c
m

r
d
c

This budget constraint is therefore equivalent to
a+ d  c+ r d
c
m

r
d
c

  r (c  d) p(a; d)
It follows, by a similar argument as in point (i) that the budget is in excess
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